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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES RESULTED 
IN AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT OF SALE 
REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO CONVEY ITS 
PROPERTY TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
The appellee in his brief has failed to address the arguments raised by 
Appellant relating to the failure of the appellee to properly accept the counter offer 
as was required by the terms of the contract itself. Instead, Plaintiff has made the 
same argument he did below that the fact that both parties may have mistakenly 
believed that a contract had been properly executed somehow overrode the strict 
language of the contract itself Plaintiff has cited no law to that effect. 
The only reference to Defendant's arguments at all is the statement made by 
Plaintiff that 'the plaintiff would simply be required to now sign the contract." 
(Plaintiffs Brief, p. 6). This argument, of course, has no validity. The language 
of the contract required strict time conditions and certainly a party who fails to 
properly accept a document cannot claim years later that the contract is binding by 
now signing it. 
The remainder of Plaintiffs arguments are red herrings as to this appeal. 
Appellant has conceded the legal principle relating to renewed offers of those 
which have expired by their own terms. Again, Plaintiff attempts to vary the terms 
of the written document with the oral testimony of what the parties believed or 
mistakenly believed at the time the last meeting occurred. The entire purpose of 
written real estate contracts is to eliminate this type of dispute from ever coming 
up in the first place. 
Likewise, Appellant has not raised in this appeal any argument concerning 
the statue of frauds since the lower court was correct in his assessment of the 
statute requirement. It should be noted, however, that the statute of frauds does 
control this transaction and that all elements of it must be observed by both parties. 
n. 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES WAS 
DISCRETIONARY BY THE LOWER COURT. 
2 
Defendant does not dispute that attorneys' fees are awarded in accordance 
with the terms of a contract. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 
1988). Although such an award is a matter of legal right, it must be reasonable 
and supported by adequate evidence. Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 219 (Utah 
App. 1990). Determination of such fees is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be overturned unless there is showing of clear abuse of 
discretion. Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at 989. An appellate court will "presume 
that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record 
clearly shows to the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984). 
In this case Plaintiff submitted the matter to the lower court on summary 
judgment with no evidence as to reasonable attorneys fees. There is no evidence 
in the record as to what those fees would have been assuming that Plaintiff 
properly prevailed. On this basis alone the trial court properly denied attorneys' 
fees. 
The question of attorneys' fees as to both sides presents an interesting twist 
because of the arguments made by the parties in this case. Plaintiff maintains that 
the real estate contract was in fact completed and that paragraph 17 controlled. 
Defendant, on the other hand, maintains that the contract was never completed 
because the plaintiff did not properly sign any counter offer allegedly made by the 
defendant. Under this scenario paragraph 17 would not be binding since there was 
no completed contract. 
3 
Under Utah law, Section 78-27-56.5 provides for reciprocal rights to 
recover attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in any action based upon a written 
contract as long as one party is allowed to recover. Thus, Defendant should be 
allowed to recover attorneys' fees in this action even if her argument is correct that 
the contract was never binding on both parties since the litigation still arises out of 
the contract regardless of whether it was a completed transaction. 
The question of attorneys' fees in the lower court should be left to that 
court's discretion in the same manner as attorneys' fees in this court must be left 
to the discretion of the deciding panel. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower court was incorrect in finding that a binding 
contract exists which requires Defendant to convey its property to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has failed to seriously address the arguments made by Defendant in its 
brief and has instead argued matters which are not in dispute. 
The question of attorneys' fees should be left to the discretion of the trial 
court and this Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of November, 1998. 
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3645 East Cascade Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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